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I. Introduction
This paper addresses the relationship between conditions in local banking markets and the
interest rates offered by banks on deposit products.  This is a timely question because banking has
been in a period of rapid change in recent years.  From 1988 to 2000, there were a record number
of bank mergers.  In large part because of the merger activity, the average size of a bank tripled
during that period. At the same time as banks were getting larger, local banking market
concentration stayed roughly constant.
1  This suggests that a main effect of the merger wave on
local markets was to replace small banks with large banks.  We explore how the growing
presence of large banks affects deposit rates and competitive conditions within markets.
Most depositors look for a bank in their local market (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002).  Thus,
the distribution of banks in a local market may affect deposit pricing.  We examine two aspects of
the structure of a local banking market: market concentration and the size distribution of banks in
the market.  Traditional models of market conditions – including those used for antitrust analysis
– focus on local market concentration.  Thus, such models would predict little change in deposit
rates from a rapid increase in bank size that left local market concentration little changed.
However, the changes in bank size might impact deposit rates if large regional or nationwide
organizations compete in different ways than small, local institutions, even when the large and
small organizations have similar local market shares.  To test this, we examine whether deposit
interest rates are affected by the market size structure of a local market, defined as the
distribution of market shares of banks of different sizes whether or not the market share is
achieved entirely in that local market (Berger, et. al., 2003).
In this paper, we look at interest rate setting at banks in the United States over the period
1988-2000 using two deposit instruments, interest-bearing checking (NOW) accounts and money
market deposit accounts (MMDAs).  These two instruments reflect different depositor bases.
NOWs are among the most widely held deposit products but individual accounts can be small.
MMDAs, on the other hand, are less widely held, but individual accounts can be large and
                                                            
1 After dropping markets with fewer than five banks, the average Herfindahl was 0.223 in 1988 and 0.226
in 2000.2
potentially very profitable for banks.
2  Moreover, many MMDA holders also have other products
at a bank, while this is true less often for checking accounts (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002).
Thus, by examining both NOWs and MMDAs we can see whether interest rates are set based on
similar factors for two different types of instrument.
Our goal is to determine how deposit interest rates offered by a bank are affected by changes
in the structure of a local market and bank-specific factors including its size.  This offers a
potential contribution both to our understanding of how prices are set and to antitrust regulation
of banks.  Antitrust regulators are concerned with how changes in market conditions affect
depositors.  Traditionally, antitrust analysis focuses on the effect on deposit rates of market
concentration, as measured by the Herfindahl index.  As an application, bank mergers are subject
to different levels of scrutiny depending on the pre-merger Herfindahl in each local market the
banks operate in and how much the merger would affect each Herfindahl.  The results in this
paper suggest that the focus of antitrust analysis be broadened since some markets react to
changes differently than others.
When looking at all banks, we find that more concentrated markets are associated with lower
deposit interest rates.  This is consistent with earlier literature (see, e.g., Berger and Hannan,
1989).  However, it turns out that this result is due to competition in urban markets only.  When
we divide markets into urban and rural ones, we find that there is no significant relationship
between market concentration and deposit rates in rural markets.
We also find that bank size matters.  In both urban and rural markets, growing banks tend to
offer higher interest rates on deposits.
3  Moreover, having more large banks in a market generally
increases rates at all banks.  This is evidence that, contrary to conventional wisdom, having more
large banks in a market can be good for depositors.  It also implies that simple measures of
market concentration may not be sufficient to predict how changes in markets, such as those that
result from mergers, will affect deposit rates.
As the market share of large banks increases, deposit rates become more sensitive to changes
in market concentration.  All else equal, an increase in market concentration reduces deposit rates
                                                            
2 According to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, 72.9 percent of depositors have a checking account
at their primary financial institution while only 51.7 percent have a money market account there (Amel and
Starr-McCluer, 2002).
3 While growing banks offer higher rates, we show that large banks might offer lower rates than small
banks.3
more in a market when it has a bigger proportion of large banks.  This may be relevant when
considering the antitrust implications of bank consolidation.
The remainder of the paper is as follows.  The next section briefly reviews the literature.
Section III describes the data and sets out the hypotheses.  The empirical results are presented in
Section IV.  Section V presents a series of robustness tests.  Finally, the last section offers some
concluding comments.
II.  Literature
The traditional approach to examining the impact of market structure on deposit interest rates
is to focus on market concentration (see Gilbert and Zaretsky, 2003, for a more extensive survey
of the literature).  The structure-conduct-performance paradigm that lies at the root of antitrust
analysis implies that as competition diminishes, prices increase (Tirole, 1988).  A number of
papers have tested the paradigm using data on bank deposits and loans.  Previous work in this
area typically finds that banks in more concentrated markets offer lower interest rates on deposits
(e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989) and higher interest rates on loans (e.g., Hannan, 1991).  This is
true even when market concentration is changing because of mergers (Prager and Hannan, 1998).
More recent studies focus on two related complicating factors.  First, many banks operate in
more than one local market.  Radecki (1998) points out that many of these so-called multimarket
banks set a single interest rate in all markets.  Thus, interest rates for these banks may be related
to conditions in a particular local market, but they are unlikely to be tied to conditions as closely
as for banks operating only in that market.
Hannan and Prager (2003) and Park and Pennacchi (2003) address a second question about
banks operating in more than one market.  They explore whether multimarket banks have an
external effect, that is, whether multimarket banks affect pricing at other banks in the markets
where they operate.  These studies model and find that interest rates at other banks tend to be
inversely related to the local market share of multimarket banks.  They offer several possible
explanations for this finding having to do with funding advantages and with organization and
efficiency issues.  Several of these explanations, such as funding advantages and diseconomies of
scale or scope, are not specific to banks operating in many markets.  Funding advantages have to
do with access to wholesale markets, which is in turn, partially a function of bank size.4
Economies of scale and scope are a function of the size and product mix of a bank, not the
number of markets it operates in.  They could exist at any large bank.  In this paper, we attempt to
isolate the impact of banks that operate in multiple markets after controlling for the effects of
bank size.
There is evidence of an external effect from large bank presence.  Berger, et. al. (2003) show
that market size structure matters in small business loan pricing.  In markets with a bigger share
of large banks, small business loan rates are lower, all else equal.  Since multimarket banks are
generally larger than single-market banks, it is possible that the results in Hannan and Prager
reflect the presence of large banks or that those in Berger, et. al., come from the presence of
multimarket banks.  One contribution of this paper is that we control for both the local market
shares of large banks and of multimarket banks.  Thus, we can distinguish between the two
external effects.
Another contribution of this paper is that we explicitly examine changes in banks over time
by using a panel data set rather than taking the approach of most previous studies that use cross
sectional analysis to infer changes over time.  As we describe below, we think that this
methodology is better suited to address important questions having to do with bank consolidation.
III. Data and methodology
We want to examine the relationship between bank deposit interest rates and competitive
conditions in a banking market.  To test this relationship, we need to define what a banking
market is and develop measures of competitive conditions.  This section defines the scope of our
analysis and explains the sample we use.
Regulatory authorities typically assume that banks compete for deposits primarily in their
local market (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002).  The local market is defined as a Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) or, for banks not in an MSA, a county.  Consistent with previous
literature, we adopt this definition of markets for our analysis (see, e.g., Berger and Hannan,
1989, and Hannan and Prager, 2003).
4
                                                            
4 Radecki (1998) and Biehl (2002) argue that banks set the same interest rate in many local markets within
the same state.  Thus, it may be more appropriate to use larger geographic areas to define markets.  To the
extent that this is true, it should add noise to our results.5
When evaluating market structure, regulators typically look at measures of local market
concentration including the Herfindahl index, which is defined as the sum of the squared market
shares of all banks in a local market.  We use the Herfindahl as our measure of market
concentration.  To focus on markets with some competition, we drop any market where there are
fewer than five banks or where the Herfindahl index is greater than 0.50, indicating a dominant
bank in the market.
One objective of this paper is to see whether banking market size structure (henceforth, size
structure) should be examined in addition to the Herfindahl index.  Size structure is meant to
capture the idea that large banks may compete in different ways than smaller banks.  The size
structure of a banking market is measured using the relative proportions of banks of different
asset sizes (see Berger, et. al., 2003).  To define size structure, we divide banks into two size
classes: small banks (less than $1 billion in assets) and large banks (greater than $1 billion in
assets).
5  We discuss the robustness of this division later.  We use the size classes to define our
size structure variable: SIZE STRUCTURE is the proportion of deposits in a local market held by
large banks (where we include assets held outside the local market to classify banks).
Banks may compete for deposits locally, but they can operate in multiple markets.  There is a
potential issue with this since the interest rate data is only provided at the aggregate bank level.
This means that we do not know the interest rate in every market a bank operates in.  However, to
the extent that banks operate in multiple markets, they generally have the vast majority of their
deposits in their home market (the market where the bank has the greatest amount of deposits).
Over 80 percent of banks have at least 90 percent of their deposits in their home market and fewer
than five percent have more than half of all deposits outside their home market.  For these
reasons, we focus on a bank’s home market and assume that the average interest rate for the bank
is the interest rate offered in the home market (there is evidence that a bank charges the same
interest rate in each of its markets, see Radecki, 1998).  We eliminate from our sample all
multimarket banks, that is, those with significant activity outside their home market (defined as
over 25 percent of deposits outside the home market).  Although we drop multimarket banks and
all bank activity outside home markets from the sample, we include all deposits when calculating
the market concentration and size structure variables.
                                                            
5 All data are 2000 dollars.6
The data we use comes from the Reports of Condition and Income (the Call Reports) from
1988 - 2000.  One advantage of using an extended time period like this is that it helps control for
the facts that interest rates move cyclically and that the spread between bank interest rates and
market interest rates can vary over time (Rosen, 2002).  We match the Call Report data with
information on market structure from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Summary of
Deposits.  Our sample includes 89,166 observations from 13,317 banks in 1,664 different
markets.  Table 1 gives descriptive statics for the sample.  The mean HERFINDAHL in the sample
is 0.184 and the mean SIZE STRUCTURE is 0.350.
6
We look at on two deposit products:  interest-paying transaction (NOW) accounts and money
market deposit accounts (MMDAs).  Banks are required to report quarterly average balances and
interest payments on these two deposit products.  We use these data to calculate an annual interest
rate, computed as the average of the quarterly interest payments divided by the quarterly
balances.  To match the deposit data, which is as of the end of June, we compute the interest rates
for the period July through June (all other annual variables are constructed similarly).  As shown
in Table 1, the average NOW rate in the sample is 3.340% and the average MMDA rate is
4.139%.  The interest rate on a deposit account alone does not indicate the profit a bank earns,
since the return on investing the deposits varies over time with the interest rate cycle.  To
illustrate the profit on these deposit products, we use the spread of the deposit interest rate over a
short-term market interest rate, in this case, the three-month Treasury bill rate.
7  As shown in
Table 1, the spreads are generally negative, as one would expect, indicating that banks generally
pay less than the Treasury rate on NOW accounts and MMDAs.
One reason that regulators analyze market conditions is to predict how changes in a particular
market affect prices (e.g., interest rates) in that market.  This is often done by looking across
markets with different structures at a given point in time.  This is the approach taken by previous
studies, which either analyzed data from different years in separate regressions (e.g., Hannan and
Prager, 2003) or use pooled data (e.g., Biehl, 2002).  Since our sample is a panel, we have the
                                                            
6 This does not indicate that large banks control 35 percent of all deposits in the banking system.  Since
there are a large number of small banks in our sample and these banks tend to be in markets with other
small banks, the sample mean overstates the market share of small banks.  During the sample period, large
banks had 67 percent of deposits, while small banks had 33 percent.
7 Because we include year dummies, the results on the variables of interest would be identical if we used
the spread rather than the deposit rate for the main regressions.7
ability to look at how markets evolve over time.
8  We do this by using fixed effect regressions.
The coefficients in the regressions reflect the effect on banks of the changes in the independent
variables over time.  In Section V, we compare the fixed effects results to those obtained from
cross sectional regressions.
Our baseline empirical model is:
DEPOSIT INTEREST RATEi,m,t  =  f(HERFINDAHLm,t, SIZE STRUCTUREm,t,
market structure controlsm,t, bank-specific controlsi,m,t, market condition controlsm,t) (1)
for bank i in market m during year t.
We use two controls for market structure beyond the Herfindahl and size structure. Hannan
and Prager (2003) argue that multimarket banks may compete differently than single-market
banks, possibly because these banks set a single interest rate for each deposit product across all
markets (Radecki, 1998).  If this is true then, it is possible that size structure is capturing the
effects of multimarket banks since 46 percent of large banks are multimarket banks compared to
13 percent for small banks.  To test whether the size structure of a market has an effect
independent of whether large banks operate in many markets, we define MULTIMARKET SHARE as
the share of deposits in a local market at banks that have at least 25 percent of their deposits
outside their home market (whether or not the local market is the bank’s home market).  Banks
with a major presence in outside their home market are less likely to base interest rate decisions
solely on conditions in their local market.  The results are not sensitive to the exact cutoff for a
multimarket bank.
Our second control for market structure is the size of the local market.  Market size, measured
by the log of total deposits in the market (LOG MKT SIZE), has been found to be associated with
lower interest rates in previous studies (e.g., Hannan and Prager, 2003).  We examine whether
this holds when we examine markets across time rather than just looking across markets at a point
in time as in earlier studies.
A number of bank-specific factors may also affect deposit rates.  First, we include a bank’s
share of the local market (LOCAL SHARE) as a control.  This is in part a measure of the bank’s
local market power.  Dick (2001) notes that many banking markets are characterized by a small
                                                            
8 One other paper that uses a panel data approach is Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), which examines bank
interest rates in Europe.8
number of dominant (price-setting) banks and a competitive fringe.  This would imply a negative
coefficient on LOCAL SHARE, since banks with market power could offer lower deposit rates.
Alternatively, a bank could achieve a larger local share because it offers higher deposit rates.
This could be a strategic objective or it could reflect a more efficient bank.  Either way, there
would be a positive correlation between LOCAL SHARE and deposit rates.
Bank size may be correlated with deposit rates since larger banks may have access to more
non-deposit sources of liabilities and may have different strategic incentives than small banks.
Size has been found to influence deposit interest rates in previous studies.  We control for bank
size by including the log of total assets (LOG ASSETS).
The next set of bank-specific factors covers non-interest features of bank accounts.  The
utility depositors get from a bank account is a function both of the net payments they receive and
of the associated services the bank provides. Deposit accounts sometimes include fees (Hannan,
2002), and there may be a tradeoff between interest paid and lower fees.  To control for fees,
define DEPOSIT FEE RATIO as the ratio of these fees to total deposits.
 9  Although this does not
separate out fees on NOWs and MMDAs (banks do not report fees broken down by deposit
product), it indicates whether a bank is a high-fee or low-fee bank.  If banks can compensate for
higher interest rates by charging higher fees, there will be a positive relationship between
DEPOSIT FEE RATIO and interest rates.
Additionally, banks provide an array of services to depositors.  For example, a customer may
value a bank that is open long hours or has a broad ATM network.  Thus, there is likely to be a
tradeoff between interest payments and services provided.  We use NON INT EXP RATIO, the ratio
of non-interest expenses to total assets, as a control for services.  The level of service also may be
a function of how well staffed a branch is (we use EMPLOYEES PER BRANCH) and how many
customers it serves (which we proxy with DEPOSITS PER BRANCH).  We expect a negative
relationship between higher service levels and interest rates.
A bank sets deposit rates, its fee schedule, and its service level jointly.  Thus, there may be
endogeneity problems from introducing the fee and service level variables.  However, the results
are robust to their exclusion.  We discuss the choice of fees and service levels more in Section V.
                                                            
9 Fees include revenues in domestic offices from ATM fees, deposit account maintenance charges,
minimum balance failure charges, per check charges, bounced check charges, stop payment orders, and
certified check fees.9
The final group of bank-specific factors we include are those related to the health of the bank.
We capture bank health using the return on assets (ROA) and the ratio of nonperforming loans to
total loans (NONPERFORMING RATIO).  It is important to control for bank health, since a weak
bank may not be able to bid aggressively for deposit share by offer high interest rates.  If weak
banks are unable to offer high deposit rates, then we expect a negative coefficient on
NONPERFORMING RATIO.  The expected sign on ROA is less clear since a healthy bank may offer
higher deposit rates, all else equal, but banks can boost their ROA directly by paying less interest
on deposits.
The market-specific factors we include mirror the bank-specific factors.  We take average
values in each local market of the bank-specific factors (except LOG ASSETS, which is captured by
the market structure variable LOG MKT SIZE).  The variables have the same names as their bank-
specific counterparts with ‘MKT’ added as a prefix.
Finally, we use year dummies to capture changes in overall economic conditions.
IV.  Results
A.  Market concentration and market size
Since our fixed effect approach is different from previous studies, as a first step in our
analysis, we check whether market concentration has the same effect as in studies that use a
cross-sectional approach.  To do this, we estimate a simpler version of (1):
DEPOSIT INTEREST RATEI,m,t  =  f(HERFINDAHLm,t, LOG MKT SIZEm,t,
bank-specific controlsi,m,t, market condition controlsm,t) (2)
for bank i in market m during year t.  This ignores any external effects of size structure and
multimarket banks.
Table 2 presents the results for the regressions of (2) using fixed effects.  The dependent
variables are the NOW rate and the MMDA rate.  We are interested primarily in the effect of
market concentration as reflected by the coefficients on HERFINDAHL.  The coefficients of –0.776
and –0.465 imply that an increase in market concentration reduces deposit rates.  To gauge the
potential magnitude impact of changing market concentration, a one standard deviation increase
in the HERFINDAHL (0.085) generates a seven basis point decrease in NOW rates (-0.776 · 0.085)10
and a four basis point decrease in MMDA rates (-0.465 · 0.085).   However, as we see below, we
must be careful when interpreting these numbers because this assumes that the effect of market
concentration on deposit rates is similar across markets, which it is not.
We discuss the control variables briefly.  There are positive coefficients on LOG MKT SIZE for
both the NOW and MMDA regressions.  This implies that deposit rates are higher in growing
markets.  A one standard deviation increase in the log of market size (0.913) leads to a 19 basis
point increase in NOW rates and a 20 basis point increase in MMDA rates.
We find positive coefficients on LOCAL SHARE.  Banks with a growing local presence,
holding market concentration constant, offer higher deposit rates.  However, we do not know
which way causation runs.  Banks could be getting more deposits because they offer higher
deposit rates.
The coefficient on LOG ASSETS, our measure of bank size, comes in with opposite signs in the
two regressions in Table 2.  We discuss why this occurs and how to interpret it below.
The other variables come in with the expected signs with one major exception.  We find that
banks with higher fees offer lower deposit rates.  A one standard deviation increase in DEPOSIT
FEE RATIO (0.006) is associated with a decrease of five basis points in NOW rates and nine basis
points in MMDA rates.  This implies that, after controlling for market structure changes, as banks
gain more pricing power, they choose to both reduce deposit rates and increase fees.  The results
do not provide evidence for the hypothesis that banks trade off deposit rates and fees.
B.  Urban versus rural markets
Studies have found significant differences between banks in urban and rural markets, both in
the composition of their deposit portfolios (e.g., DeYoung, et. al, 2004) and in the interest rates
they pay (e.g., Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan and Prager, 2003).  We may partially capture
this in LOG MKT SIZE, since urban markets are more likely to be large and rural ones small.  To
examine whether different factors influence deposit rate evolution in urban and rural markets, we
split our sample by whether the local market is in an MSA.
10  We follow convention by
classifying local markets in MSAs as urban and those in non-MSA counties as rural.  There are
351 urban markets and 1,286 rural markets.  The urban markets, not surprisingly, have more
                                                            
10 The results are similar if we divide markets based on size.  This is not surprising, since urban markets
tend to be much larger than rural markets (although not all urban markets are large and not all rural markets
are small).11
banks per market.  Overall, we have 47,202 observations from urban markets and 41,964 from
rural markets.  Table 3 has summary statistics for the urban and rural market subsamples.
One conclusion that jumps out when we estimate (2) separately for urban and rural markets is
that the HERFINDAHL is only significant for urban markets. Table 4 has the regression results for
urban and rural markets.  For both NOW accounts and MMDAs, an increase in market
concentration significantly reduces deposit rates in urban markets.  However, as shown in the
columns (2) and (4) of Table 4, the coefficient on HERFINDAHL is insignificant for rural markets.
This surprising result calls into question whether mergers or other changes to market
concentration have any effect on deposit rates in rural markets.  It also leads us to analyze urban
and rural markets separately.
Another interesting difference between urban and rural markets concerns the bank size
variable.  Increasing bank size leads to higher deposit rates except for NOW accounts in rural
markets.  The other control variables generally have the same signs as in the full sample
regressions.
C.  Market size structure
To examine the impact of size structure on interest rates, we use (1) to regress NOW and
MMDA rates on market concentration, size structure, and controls.  We present results for urban
markets and for rural markets.  The full sample results, not presented, have coefficients that are
midway between those for the two subsamples.
The first and fourth columns of Table 5 present the urban market results adding SIZE
STRUCTURE to the model reported in Table 4.   The coefficients on the HERFINDAHL variable in
the two regressions are both negative, significant, and of a similar magnitude to those in the
regressions without the size structure variable.  This suggests that size structure is picking up
something different from market concentration.
The coefficients on the size structure variables are both positive and statistically significant.
An increase in the deposit share of large banks, SIZE STRUCTURE, leads to an increase in deposit
rates.  Adding one standard deviation to SIZE STRUCTURE (0.263) increases NOW rates by four
basis points and MMDA rates by seven basis points at all banks in the market.  These results
suggest that competition is more intensive in markets where large banks have a bigger deposit
share.12
The second and fifth columns in Table 5 give the results when we add HERF * SIZE STR, HERF
* LOCAL SHARE, and SIZE STR * LOCAL SHARE, interaction variables among market concentration,
size structure, and local market share.  The coefficients on the HERF * SIZE STR and HERF * LOCAL
SHARE are negative and significant. Thus, the direction and magnitude of the effect of a change in
market concentration or size structure on deposit rates depends on the conditions in the particular
market.  We evaluate the impact of changes on deposit rates using the derivative of the particular
deposit rate with respect to the change evaluated at the sample means.  Taking the derivative of
the NOW rates as given in (1) with respect to the HERFINDAHL gives the marginal effect on





 =  0.092  -  1.260 SIZE STRUCTURE  -  5.109 LOCAL SHARE. (3)
Evaluating (3) at the sample mean in urban markets of SIZE STRUCTURE (0.566) and the LOCAL
SHARE (0.028) shows that the interest rate on NOW accounts is predicted to decrease by a
statistically significant 0.948 basis points per 0.01 increase in the HERFINDAHL.  Using the same
approach, an increase on 0.01 in SIZE STRUCTURE at the sample means predicts an increase of
0.191 basis points in the NOW rate at all banks in the market.  These results are similar in
magnitude to those in column (1) Table 4.
The effects of changes in market concentration and size structure on MMDA rates in urban
markets show the same pattern.  At the sample means, the interest rate on NOW accounts is
predicted to decrease by 0.646 basis points per 0.01 increase in the HERFINDAHL and increase by
0.331 basis points per 0.01 increase in SIZE STRUCTURE.
Once we introduce the interaction terms, market size no longer has a significant effect on
deposit rates but growing banks (as measured by LOG ASSETS) still are predicted to offer larger
deposit rates.
These results offer something of a paradox regarding the effects of large banks on deposit
rates.  On the one hand, as banks get larger, they offer higher deposit rates and increasing the
share of large banks in a market generally increases deposit rates at all banks in the market.  This
suggests that growth in bank size, such as during the recent consolidation, can be good for
depositors, even those at small banks.  On the other hand, large banks appear to amplify the13
negative effects of market concentration.  Increasing the deposit share of large banks means that
interest rates fall more when concentration increases, something that is bad for depositors.
The third and sixth columns of Table 5 presents the results for urban markets of regressions
that include MULTIMARKET SHARE and HERF * MULTI SHARE, an interaction term between the
HERFINDAHL and MULTIMARKET SHARE.  Column (3) presents the results for NOW accounts and
column (6) presents the results for MMDAs.  Given the coefficients on the multimarket variables,
at the sample means, a 0.01 increase in the MULTIMARKET SHARE is predicted to increase the
interest rate on NOW accounts by 0.082 basis points and the interest on MMDAs by 0.122 basis
points.  These results are different than those in Hannan and Prager (2003), in large part because
of a difference in controls and the fact that we focus on urban markets.
11
Introducing the multimarket variables does not change the qualitative impact of the size
structure variables.  Thus, there is a role for size structure above that due to the fact that many
large banks operate in multiple markets.
When we examine rural markets, the picture is very different.  The rural markets results are
reported in Table 6.  Changes in market concentration do not have the expected effect in rural
markets.  Increasing the Herfindahl is predicted to have little change on NOW rates and to have
little change or increase MMDA rates.  The predicted effect of changes in size structure is
different for NOWs and MMDAs.  An increase in SIZE STRUCTURE reduces NOW rates but
increases MMDA rates.
It seems clear that competition works differently in rural markets than in urban markets (and
than in standard industrial organization models).  This may be due to structural considerations.
For example, rural markets are generally less densely developed and populated than urban
markets.  This may increase the cost for depositors to shop around, making deposit rates less
sensitive to competitive conditions.  However, there is much that needs to be understood about
the differences between urban and rural markets.
                                                            
11 When we use all markets and regress deposit rates on the market concentration, the multimarket
variables, bank size, and market size for 1996 and 1999 (the two years in the Hannan and Prager study), we
find a negative cross sectional relationship between the multimarket share and deposit rates.  However, by
introducing the size structure variables and other controls, this relationship disappears, even when we
include both urban and rural markets.  In addition, when we run the regression without size structure and
the controls, but exclude rural markets, we get a positive effect from increasing multimarket share.  Finally,
some differences between Hannan and Prager and this study may occur because we use fixed effects rather
than a cross section as in Hannan and Prager.  See Section V for a discussion of this.14
V.  Robustness
This section shows that the major results on the relationship between changes in market
structure and deposit interest rates are robust.  Previous studies of the effect of market conditions
on interest rates have used cross-sectional analysis rather than the fixed effect approach here.  We
run pooled cross section regressions to mimic the approach of the earlier work.  Also, as noted in
the introduction, there have been a large number of bank mergers over our sample period.  We
see how introducing merger variables affect our results.  The next set of robustness tests focuses
on fees and services.  Deposit products are packages that include interest, fees, and services.  We
examine whether market concentration and size structure affect the provision of fees and services.
Finally, we look at other tests of robustness.
We report results for the urban market sample only.  The results for rural markets are similar
(after factoring the differences described earlier) except that statistical significance is weaker.  To
simplify the presentation, we run all the regressions in this section without interaction terms.  The
results are qualitatively similar with the interaction terms.
A.  Cross sectional analysis
One question implicit, if not explicit, in many earlier studies of deposit rates is how changes
in market structure, such as those resulting from a merger, affect deposit rates.  We argue that
fixed effect regression often is a more appropriate methodology to answer this question than is
the cross sectional analysis that is typically used.  Cross sectional analysis assumes that we can
look across banks with different values of a control variable to deduce the effect of changes in the
variable at a particular bank.  However, if there are missing controls in the analysis, then
comparing banks may not provide a good measure of what will happen at a single bank.  Fixed
effect analysis, on the other hand, explicitly examines what happens to a bank over time as the
control variables – such as market structure – change.
There are issues where cross sectional analysis might be the appropriate approach.  For
example, if you want to know whether, on average, deposit rates at a point in time are higher at
large or small banks (as opposed to how deposit rates might evolve as a bank grows).  For these
reasons, and to show where the predictions of the two approaches differ, we run the analysis in
the previous section using a pooled cross sectional approach (that is, using our panel, but without15
fixed effects).    Table 7 presents the results for the cross sectional regressions and, for
comparison, results for the same regressions using fixed effects.
12
For the two major market structure variables, the cross sectional regressions paint a similar
picture to the fixed effect regressions.  Increasing market concentration reduces deposit rates
while increasing large banks’ share of local deposits, SIZE STRUCTURE, generally increases
deposit rates in both sets of regressions.
When we turn to the other controls, however, the results differ between the two
methodologies.  In general, looking across markets using the cross-sectional analysis, we find that
larger markets and larger banks have lower rates.  However, the fixed effect regressions imply
that higher deposit rates are associated with growing markets and growing banks.  For example,
the coefficient on LOG ASSETS is negative in the cross section and positive for fixed effects.  So,
larger banks pay lower deposit rates but growing banks pay higher rates.  To put it another way,
banks of any size that want to grow, do so by offering higher rates, but all else equal, large banks
offer lower deposit rates.
The differences between the two methodologies reiterate the importance of tailoring the
technique to the question being asked.  The fixed effect approach is appropriate for many of the
questions asked by antitrust regulators.  For example, it allows them to predict what will happen
to interest rates in a market if two banks merge.
B.  Mergers
During the sample period, the banking industry was going through a consolidation.  There
were over 3,000 mergers between banks during the sample period.  A number of studies have
shown that mergers can affect deposit pricing (Prager and Hannan, 1998) and small business
lending (Berger, et. al., 1998).  In this section, we introduce measures of merger activity to our
analysis.
Merger activity had a substantial effect on the local markets we examine, although it was
stronger in the urban markets we focus on here.  Our measure of aggregate merger activity in a
local market is PERCENT ACQUIRED, the percentage of deposits in a local market that is acquired
during the preceding three years.
13  On average, 11.6 percent of deposits are acquired during a
                                                            
12 Note that the p-values may be overstated for the pooled cross section since the errors terms over time at a
particular bank can be correlated.
13  Years are defined from July through June to match the deposit data.16
three-year period in an urban local market (compared to 6.6 percent in a rural market).  However,
only 65.1 percent of urban markets have a merger in an average three-year period (22.1 percent in
rural markets).  In these markets, merger targets account for 17.8 percent of deposits (29.7
percent in rural markets).  Thus, where they occur, mergers can have a large impact on a market.
The effect of a merger on deposit prices in a market may depend on whether the acquirer is
entering the market with the merger or whether the acquirer already has a presence in the market.
We call the latter acquisitions in-market mergers.  In the sample period, 65.9 percent of urban
mergers were in market (19.8 percent for rural markets), but the targets of these mergers tend to
be small.  In-market mergers account for 30.1 percent of all assets acquired in urban markets (8.6
percent in rural markets).  Let PERCENT ACQUIRED IN MARKET be the percent of assets acquired in
a market by in-market mergers during the preceding three years.
Table 8 presents the results of regressions that include the merger variables.  Increasing
merger activity generally pushes NOW rates in a different direction than it does MMDA rates.
In-market mergers increase NOW rates, but there is no effect from other mergers.  For MMDAs,
all mergers have a negative impact on rates, with in-market mergers reducing rates by more.
Comparing Table 8 with earlier results shows that the introduction of the merger variables
has little qualitative effect on the coefficients for the size structure and market concentration
variables.  Thus, to the extent that merger activity affects interest rates, it does not take away from
the impact of size structure and market concentration.
C.  Fees and services
Banks can charge fees and provide services to depositors.  Depositors should select banks
based on the package of deposit rates, fees, and services.  Thus, the same market- and bank-
specific factors that affect deposit rates should influence fees and service levels.  We test this by
replacing deposit rates with measures of fees or services in our baseline model:
Fee or serviceI,m,t  =  f(HERFINDAHLm,t, SIZE STRUCTUREm,t,
market structure controlsm,t, bank-specific controlsi,m,t, market condition controlsm,t), (4)
for bank i in market m during year t.  We report results with DEPOSIT FEE RATIO as our measure
of fees and NON INT EXP RATIO, EMPLOYEES PER BRANCH, and DEPOSITS PER BRANCH as our
measures of services.
  We use all the controls in equation (1) expect that we exclude the17
interaction terms to simplify the discussion and we leave out the market average of the dependent
variable.
When market conditions change to allow a bank to offer lower deposit rates, we expect the
bank to also increase fees and reduce services.  So, when competition decreases, fees should rise
and services fall.  This is because when banks have an opportunity to increase profit, they should
do so using a package of rate decreases, fee increases, and service decreases.  Again, the expected
signs on the coefficients are a function of the fixed-effect analysis used here.  If we were to look
across banks in a given market, we might find some banks specializing in high deposit rates with
few services and high fees while others specialize in high services and low fees with low deposit
rates.
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 9.  The findings are mixed, in part
because our proxies for services are inexact.
We get the predicted relationships for deposit fees.  There is a positive coefficient on
HERFINDAHL and a negative coefficient on SIZE STRUCTURE.  Increasing the HERFINDAHL by one
standard deviation implies a predicted increase in fees of 1.7 percent while a one standard
deviation increase in SIZE STRUCTURE reduces fees by 2.4 percent.
The ratio of non-interest expense to total assets is increasing in HERFINDAHL and decreasing
in SIZE STRUCTURE.  This is the opposite of what we expect if banks are forced to offer more
services in more competitive environments.  However, NON INT EXP RATIO can be high either
because a bank provides services that depositors value or because the bank is inefficient.  There is
some evidence that banks in less concentrated markets are less efficient (Hannan and Berger,
1998), which is consistent with our results.  Similarly, the negative coefficient on HERFINDAHL
when EMPLOYEES PER BRANCH is the dependent variable is consistent with a negative correlation
between concentration and efficiency.
DEPOSITS PER BRANCH may be our best measure of service levels for two reasons.  First,
depositors like to bank close to home (Amel and Starr-McCluer, 2002), so having more branches
per deposit is likely to place branches close to depositors.  Second, DEPOSITS PER BRANCH is the
only one of the service proxies to be measured at the branch rather than bank level.  The results
for DEPOSITS PER BRANCH are presented in the final column of Table 9.  The signs on the
coefficients for HERFINDAHL and SIZE STRUCTURE are consistent with more services in18
competitive markets, although only the coefficient on the Herfindahl is significant.  A one
standard deviation increase in the HERFINDAHL is predicted to increase deposits per branch by 2.7
percent.
Overall, there is some evidence that the non-interest portions of the package of payments and
services react to changes at banks in a manner consistent with the effects on deposit rates.  This
suggests that banks view deposit rates, fees, and services as a package that they adjust as market
conditions change.
D.  Other robustness checks
We also do several other robustness checks.  The results are summarized in this section.
In the main sample, we exclude multimarket banks (although their deposits are counted in the
market concentration and size structure variables).  These banks are excluded because we do not
have interest rates on a market-level basis.  Thus, given the significant deposits outside the home
market, we cannot be sure that the average interest rate for the bank as a whole is similar to the
interest rate in the home market.  However, when we run the main regressions including
multimarket banks in their home market, we find that the qualitative results are similar.
We also explore the division of banks into size classes.  The results are robust to changes in
the division between large and small banks.  There does not appear to be a reason to have more
than two size classes.  For example, we split large banks into two subclasses: somewhat large
banks (total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion) and very large banks (total assets above
$10 billion).  Three size structure variables are created based on this division into small,
somewhat large, and very large banks.  When we run regressions of (1) for NOW rates and
MMDA rates using the new size classes, the results show that there are few significant
differences between somewhat large and very large banks (for NOW accounts, the very large
banks offer slightly higher rates while for MMDAs, size structure has a smaller but still positive
effect for very large banks).
There are a large number of small banks in our sample.  To ensure that our results hold for all
banks, not just small banks, we run our baseline regressions dropping all small banks.  When
using a minimum size of either $500 million in assets or $1 billion in assets, we get qualitatively
the same results as for the full sample (whether or not we include multimarket banks).  This
suggests that the results hold for all banks, not just for small banks.19
There is evidence that the interest rates banks offer on deposit products move sluggishly with
market rates and that the speed of adjustment of deposit rates to market rates may depend on the
spread between them (Neumark and Sharpe, 1991; Rosen, 2002).  Examining the average spread
between the bank deposit rate and the three-month Treasury bill rate (or other market rates)
shows that bank deposit rates were much lower relative to the Treasury rate in 1991-1993 than in
the other years of the sample.  To see whether the effects of size structure and market
concentration depend on the spread, we run the main regressions of (1) for the 1991-1993 period
only.  We find qualitatively similar results to those reported earlier.
Overall, the qualitative results on the importance of size structure are robust to changes in the
sample.
VI.  Conclusions
The recent bank consolidation increased the average size of banks without having much
impact on local market concentration, the focus of antitrust scrutiny.  This paper explores whether
the consolidation nevertheless had an impact on bank deposit interest rates.  We find that deposit
rates can be affected when local markets change, even if the changes do not alter market
concentration.
We show that the size of the banks in a local market matters, even when that size is achieved
outside the local market.  Changing the size structure of the market by increasing the share of
large banks in a market leads to higher deposit rates at all banks in the market, even when market
concentration is held constant.  Size structure can affect deposit rates in another way as well.  As
the share of large banks increases, interest rates become more sensitive to changes in market
concentration.
There is also a second way that the size of banks in a local market affects deposit rates.  We
find that growing banks tend to offer higher interest rates on deposits, all else equal.
An interesting result in this paper is that the urban and rural markets react very differently to
changes in market conditions.  For example, previous studies find that increasing market
concentration leads to higher interest rates.  However, we find that this is true in urban markets
only.  Changes in market concentration do not seem to have a significant affect on deposit rates in20
rural markets.  This is important since rural markets tend to be concentrated, and thus it is more
likely that proposed mergers in these markets will generate antitrust concerns.
Finally, we use a panel data set rather than the cross sectional (or pooled) data sets in most
previous work.  One advantage of a panel is that it allows us to use fixed effect regressions.
These give explicit comparisons of changes within markets rather than inferring what would
happen in a market by looking across markets.  Cross sectional analysis may not be appropriate if
the goal is to predict the effects of changes in market conditions.
In this paper, we show that market conditions have an important impact on how banks set
deposit rates, but that the impact is more complex than previously thought.  This has implications
for antitrust policy.  For example, as noted, we find no relationship between market concentration
and deposit rates in rural banking markets.  Also, we find that the movement toward larger banks
has some beneficial effects for depositors.  However, deposit rates become more sensitive to
market concentration as the share of large banks in a market increases.  Thus, while consolidation
may offer some benefits to depositors as large banks replace small banks in local markets without
changing market concentration, it also means that antitrust regulators have to be more aware of
any changes in market concentration.21
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Table 1.  Summary statistics
Summary statistics for the full sample of 89,166 bank-year observations.  Includes all banks except those
with more than 25 percent of deposits outside their home market and those in markets with fewer than five
banks or a Herfindahl of 0.50 or greater.  All interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads are in
percentages.  All dollar values are in 2000 dollars.
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max
NOW rate 3.348 1.349 0.383 8.922
Spread: NOW rate – 3 month T-bill rate -2.223 1.392 -5.936 2.519
MMDA rate 4.139 1.308 0.000 10.860
Spread: NOW rate – 3 month T-bill rate -1.433 1.265 -6.150 3.014
Herfindahl index (HERFINDAHL) 0.184 0.085 0.033 0.500
Market share of small banks 0.650 0.325 0.000 1.000
Market share of large banks (SIZE STRUCTURE) 0.350 0.325 0.000 1.000
Market share of banks with at least 25 percent of
deposits outside home market (MULTIMARKET SHARE)
0.299 0.278 0.000 0.997
Log of banking market size (LOG MKT SIZE) 9.265 0.903 7.523 11.493
Share of bank in local market (LOCAL SHARE) 0.092 0.111 0.000 0.663
Log of total assets of a bank (LOG ASSETS) 7.834 0.448 5.952 10.153
Fees on deposits divided by total deposits (DEPOSIT
FEE RATIO)
0.009 0.006 0.000 0.038
Ratio of non-interest expense to total assets (NON INT
EXP RATIO)
0.033 0.013 0.000 0.472
Employees per branch, thousands (EMPLOYEES PER
BRANCH)
0.020 0.026 0.001 3.130
Deposits per branch, $ millions (DEPOSITS PER
BRANCH)
0.037 0.061 0.000 5.324
Return on assets (ROA) 0.008 0.011 -0.376 0.129
Ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans
(NONPERFORMING RATIO)
0.015 0.021 0.000 0.697
Percent of assets acquired in mergers in the prior
three years (PCT ACQUIRED)
0.079 0.137 0.000 1.788
Percent of assets acquired in mergers in the prior
three years by banks in the local market (PCT
ACQUIRED IN MKT)
0.028 0.057 0.000 0.55123
Table 2. Regressions of deposit interest rates on market concentration using (2).
Regressions of (2) using fixed-effects model.  Year dummies not shown.  There are 89,166 observations.
Includes all banks except those with more than 25 percent of deposits outside their home market and those
in markets with fewer than five banks or a Herfindahl of 0.50 or greater.  All interest rates (NOW and







































































Table 3.  Summary statistics by type of market
Summary statistics broken down by type of market.  Urban markets are those in MSAs while rural markets
are non-MSA counties.  Includes all banks except those with more than 25 percent of deposits outside their
home market and those in markets with fewer than five banks or a Herfindahl of 0.50 or greater.  All
interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads are in percentages. All dollar values are in 2000 dollars.
Urban markets Rural markets
Variable Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
NOW rate 3.280 1.406 3.425 1.278
MMDA rate 4.176 1.349 4.097 1.259
HERFINDAHL 0.139 0.063 0.235 0.077
SIZE STRUCTURE 0.566 0.263 0.106 0.184
MULTIMARKET SHARE 0.372 0.295 0.216 0.231
LOG MKT SIZE 9.977 0.632 8.464 0.264
LOCAL SHARE 0.028 0.054 0.164 0.115
LOG ASSETS 7.966 0.477 7.686 0.359
DEPOSIT FEE RATIO 0.011 0.007 0.008 0.005
NON INT EXP RATIO 0.036 0.015 0.029 0.009
EMPLOYEES PER BRANCH 0.023 0.034 0.016 0.012
DEPOSITS PER BRANCH 0.042 0.080 0.031 0.024
ROA 0.007 0.013 0.010 0.008
NONPERFORMING RATIO 0.016 0.023 0.014 0.019
PCT ACQUIRED 0.106 0.149 0.050 0.116
PCT ACQUIRED IN MKT 0.047 0.067 0.007 0.031
Observations 47,202 41,96425
Table 4. Regressions of deposit interest rates on market concentration using (2), sample divided by
market type.
Regressions of (2) using fixed-effects model.  Year dummies not shown. Urban markets are those in MSAs
while rural markets are non-MSA counties.  Includes all banks except those with more than 25 percent of
deposits outside their home market and those in markets with fewer than five banks or a Herfindahl of 0.50
or greater. There are 47,202 observations for the large market sample, and 41.964 for the small market
sample.  All dollar values are in 2000 dollars. Asymptotic p values are in parentheses,









































































































































R-squared 0.818 0.820 0.825 0.76526
Table 5.  Regressions of deposit interest rates on market concentration and size structure variables
using (1), urban markets only.
Regressions of (1) using fixed-effects model for urban markets.  Year dummies not shown.  There are
47,202 observations. Includes all banks in MSAs except those with more than 25 percent of deposits
outside their home market.  All interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads are in percentages. All dollar
values are in 2000 dollars.  Asymptotic p values are in parentheses.
NOW rates MMDA rates



















































































































































































































































R-squared 0.817 0.816 0.816 0.785 0.784 0.78327
Table 6.  Regressions of deposit interest rates on market concentration and size structure variables
using (1), rural markets only.
Regressions of (1) using fixed-effects model for rural markets.  Year dummies not shown.  There are
41,964 observations. Includes all banks in non-MSA counties except those with more than 25 percent of
deposits outside their home market and those in markets with fewer than five banks or a Herfindahl of 0.50
or greater.  All interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads are in percentages. All dollar values are in
2000 dollars.  Asymptotic p values are in parentheses.  The derivatives are defined in the text.
NOW rates MMDA rates













































































































































































































































R-squared 0.821 0.819 0.819 0.765 0.764 0.76428
Table 7.  Comparison of cross sectional and fixed effect regressions for urban markets.
Regressions of (1) using pooled time series (cross sectional) model and panel (fixed effects) model for
urban markets.  Year dummies not shown.  There are 47,202 observations. Includes all banks in MSAs
except those with more than 25 percent of deposits outside their home market.  All interest rates (NOW and
MMDA) and spreads are in percentages. All dollar values are in 2000 dollars.  Asymptotic p values are in
parentheses.































































































































































R-squared 0.842 0.816 0.810 0.78429
Table 8.  Regressions of deposit interest rates using (1) with merger variables, urban markets only.
Regressions of (1) with the addition of merger variables using fixed-effects model for urban markets.  Year
dummies not shown.  There are 47,202 observations. Includes all banks in MSAs except those with more
than 25 percent of deposits outside their home market.  All interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads






























































































Table 9.  Regressions of fees and services using (4), urban markets only.
Regressions of (4) using fixed-effects model for urban markets.  Year dummies not shown.  There are
47,202 observations. Includes all banks in MSAs except those with more than 25 percent of deposits
outside their home market.  All interest rates (NOW and MMDA) and spreads are in percentages. All dollar

















































































































































R-squared 0.187 0.255 0.160 0.3311
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